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An Epidemiologist at Work:
The Personal Papers of Sir Richard Doll
CHRIS BECKETT*
Introduction
The personal papers of Professor Sir Richard Doll, CH, OBE, distinguished
epidemiologist, are now catalogued and available for consultation at the Wellcome
Library for the History and Understanding of Medicine.' Illustrating a life-long
commitment to epidemiological research, they evince a strong sense of historical
continuity and public responsibility, and demonstrate very well the social and
ethical nexus in which epidemiology is rooted. Its focus on the balance of health
benefits to be gained by a given community as a whole has, therefore, a utilitarian
philosophical cast in its careful and disinterested weighing of risk and benefit.
Ample evidence of epidemiology's statistical core-from computer-generated data
to graphs and tables-is contained in the papers, as are the reasoning processes
that lead to a balanced and supported set of conclusions. In addition to illustrating
the epidemiologist at work, the papers allow us to hear something of the voices
of those individuals and constituent groups of society who-through vested
interest, uncertainty or vulnerability-have kept a close watch on many of the
conclusions drawn, conclusions that may have seemed to some, from a professional,
corporate or community point of vantage, to be more balanced in expression
than they would have liked. Certainly there is no doubting on the evidence of
the papers preserved-in the multiple drafts of papers, and in the close readings
of the papers of others-that Doll was meticulous in his choice of words and
their import. Taken as a whole, the Doll papers provide an insight into the
practice of epidemiology in the second half of the twentieth century, a period in
which the randomized trial-now much elaborated and often great in scale-has
flourished.
As far as the practice of epidemiology in the period following the Second World
War is concerned-when Doll began to work on clinical trials under Francis Avery
* Chris Beckett, BA, MA, MA, Archive 'PP/DOL comprises 460 files stored in 60
Cataloguer, Special Collections, The Wellcome boxes, spanning the years 1943-98. The collection
Library for the History and Understanding of is organized as follows: A. Regius Professor of
Medicine, Wellcome Trust, 183 Euston Road, Medicine, University ofOxford; B. Research; C.
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Jones at Central Middlesex Hospital and underAustin Bradford Hill at the Statistical
Research Unit of the Medical Research Council-he is in no doubt about the
significance of Bradford Hill's contribution to the direction that epidemiology was
to take. Doll's obituary for Sir Austin Bradford Hill notes the impact on the field
ofBradford Hill's series ofintroductory papers on statistical principles, firstpublished
in the Lancet in 1937,2 in which he "laid the foundation for the burgeoning science
of epidemiology and transformed the conduct of clinical trials by demonstrating
the advantages of randomisation."3 In his subsequent paper on Bradford Hill's
contribution to the progress of medical science, Doll identifies "the retrospective
andprospective studiesdesignedbyBradfordHill" as "thebasictoolsofepidemiology
throughout the world."4
It was, of course, Doll's early work under Bradford Hill that established
smoking-the single word most readily associated with Doll in the mind of the
general public-as the overwhelming cause of the lung cancer epidemic of the
twentieth century.5 Following Bradford Hill's retirement in 1961, Doll was
appointed Director of the MRC Statistical Research Unit, and his subsequent
work on smoking and lung cancer with statistician Richard Peto further
substantiated the causal link. Despite, however, the centrality of smoking and
lung cancer to Doll's professional career, it does not dominate the collection of
papers at the Wellcome Library, although cancer research in general is its thread
of continuity. Indeed, it is disappointing to find that the early research conducted
with Bradford Hill is not represented, although there is a limited range of
material relating to the subsequent prospective study of doctors that would later
resoundingly confirm earlier conclusions. Years later, in the course of preparing
the paper 'Medical effects of smoking: problems and perspectives',6 Doll checked
his memory of events with Bradford Hill, wanting to, as he put it, set the
historical record straight. The file (PP/DOL/D.3/24) contains a brief exchange of
letters between the two in which a prevailing anecdotal suggestion-that the
original idea to base a prospective study on doctors' smoking habits had come
to Bradford Hill whilst he was playing golf-is dismissed as "apocryphal", albeit,
as the story has it, a stroke of genius.
2 Introducing the series, the Lancet leader
begins: "For most of us figures impinge on an
educational blind spot .. ." (2 January 1937,
p. 31). The series was immediately re-published as
Principles ofmedical statistics (1937).
3 Doll, 'Obituary: Sir Austin Bradford Hill',
Lancet, 1991, 337: 1154. More recently, Alan
Yoshioka, Br. med J., 1998, 317: 1220-3, has
argued that the MRC streptomycin randomized
trial of 1946, devised by Bradford Hill, is "not as
novel as it is usually portrayed", citing the
procedures proposed in Feldmen and Hinshaw's
tuberculosis paper of 1944, which presented
various strategies for patient allocation, including
chance. A much earlier instance of the
randomized clinical trial is discussed by A
Hr6bjartsson, P C Gotzsche, C Gluud, 'The
controlled clinical trial turns 100 years: Fibiger's
trial of serum treatment ofdiphtheria', Br med
J., 1998, 317: 1243-5.
4Doll, 'Sir Austin Bradford Hill and the
progress of medical science', Br. med. J., 1992,
305: 1521-6, p. 1523. For retrospective studies
read case control studies, and for prospective
studies read cohort studies.
'Richard Doll and A Bradford Hill, 'Smoking
and carcinoma of the lung', Br. med J., 1950, ii:
739-48.
6The Heath Clark Lecture, delivered at the
London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine, 15 January 1985.
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Figure 1: Sir Richard Doll at Harvard University Commencement, 9 June 1988, at which he
received an Honorary Doctor of Science degree. PP/DOL/D.3/59.
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The most extensive primary research materials represented in the collection are
drawn from the numerous trials in the field ofgastroenterology conducted at Central
Middlesex Hospital (1945-69):7
In 1945 I was looking for a job ... when I had the good fortune to be introduced to
Dr Avery Jones. He had just then had the idea that clues to the causes of gastric and
duodenal ulcers might be obtained if differences could be found in the frequency with
which they occurred in men and women in different occupations.... His clinical
responsibilities, however, prevented him from conducting a survey himself and he obtained
a grant from the Medical Research Council to employ a medical assistant to conduct one
under his supervision. I was offered an appointment to work on the project and secured[,]
as a result, a lifelong friend and teacher with whom I collaborated actively in research for
twenty-four years.8
The collection contains material from a range of clinical trials of treatments of
gastric ulcer: from an investigation ofthe influence ofsmoking, to the role ofblood
group distribution and family history; from the efficacy of liquorice treatment, to
the efficacy of intragastric milk drips in uncomplicated gastric ulcer; and from
comparative trials to determine rates ofhealing, to cortisone in ulcerative colitis.
Other early material ofparticular interest, ofwhich I shall have more to say in a
moment, is the influential study of the incidence of lung cancer amongst asbestos
workers at the Turner Brothers (as it was then known) Rochdale factory: included
are several drafts of the landmark 1955 paper, as well as subsequent papers (1965,
1966 and 1968), based upon data supplied by the company, together with raw data
and much related correspondence between Doll and Dr John Knox, then Chief
Medical Officer at Turner Brothers Asbestos Co. Ltd, and later correspondence
between Knox and I D Hill (Bradford Hill's son).
As Doll's international reputation grew, he received numerous honours (see,
for example, Figures 1 and 2) and many opportunities to lecture around the
world. The collection contains the drafts and final texts of the majority of the
later papers (1968-91) delivered at national and international conferences and
meetings. Many of the files of these papers contain, in addition, preparatory
notes, background reading and germane correspondence. Along with opportunities
to lecture came invitations to act, at times controversially, as a consultant
epidemiologist and as an expert witness. Thus, for example, the collection contains
much original material (considered in more detail below) relating to the Spanish
Toxic Oil epidemic of the 1980s. Doll was appointed by the World Health
Organisation as an independent and respected expert to weigh the evidence that
adulterated cooking oil was the cause of the toxic syndrome, a judgement, as
we shall see, not all Spanish doctors accepted. A further example offered by the
"'Early randomised trials can properly be series of trials of treatment for gastric ulcer
criticised on the grounds that they were often too conducted by Avery Jones and me in the 1950s
small to have any chance ofdetecting moderate and '60s, which recorded the percentage
effects. Small trials can be successful when the reduction in the size of the ulcer over a fixed
effect is large but this seldom occurs. They can time." Doll, 'Controlled trials: the 1948
also be successful when the effect is moderate and watershed', Br. med J., 1998, 317: 1217-20.
the outcome is measured quantitatively, as in the "Thecontrolled trial' (1984), PP/DOL/D.3/14.
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Figure 2: Sir Richard Doll and the operatic soprano Jessye Norman, Honorands, Harvard
University Commencement, 9 June 1988. PP/DOL/D.3/59.
collection of Doll's expert opinion is provided by a case against the petro-
chemical company EniChem, which had asked Doll to review evidence and
prepare an expert's report. The collection contains Doll's report ('Cancer caused
by vinyl chloride'), together with correspondence with Italian lawyers and
background materials for a case that concerned more than 400 workers exposed
to vinyl chloride between 1960 and 1993 at the EniChem production plant (the
largest in Italy) at Porto Marghera, Venice.
Further clinical trial material from the later period of Doll's career is available
in papers from the MRC trial (single blind) of mild hyper-tension (1978-85), for
which Doll acted as Chair ofthe ethical committee. The papers offer an instructive
window onto the functional role of ethical considerations in clinical trials, here
actively asserted in confidential discussion of an appropriate trial dose for
bendrofluazide, and in tracing the source of an information leak. Another later
strand to the collection is the correspondence and papers from Doll's period
(1969-79) as Regius Professor of Medicine in the University of Oxford. During
his professorship, most of the planning and development of the John Radcliffe
Hospital complex was undertaken, and many of the papers relate to this project
(and include several architect's plans). Although removed from the world of
immediate medical research, Doll's papers of university administration not
only illustrate an unsurprising assiduous attention to detail-in this instance,
administrative detail-but also reveal Doll as a skilful manager of people,
demonstrating a sure-footedness in human relations that seems to have accompanied
407Chris Beckett
him throughout his professional career, not least in achieving the donations that
enabled the establishment of Green College, Oxford, where he served as first
Warden in his last professional post.9
For the remainder of this introductory paper, I should like to highlight aspects
of the context of epidemiological practice as it is reflected in the collection. I
began by noting that epidemiology is firmly rooted in a social and ethical nexus.
Two areas of study-namely, lung cancer in association with asbestos and
the Spanish episode of toxicity generally referred to as Spanish Toxic Oil
Syndrome-demonstrate very well something of the social, economic and political
pressures that commonly surround epidemiological research, and provide illustrative
instances of those voices of community and vested interest that refuse to remain
silent.
Quddpro Quo"0
Controversy and litigation continue without abatement in the grim history of
asbestos and asbestos-related death and disease. It is a cruel irony that a material
supremely useful, resistant to both fire and decay, and once proudly and loudly
vaunted as the best protection that money could buy, should have turned out to be
so deadly. A recent study produced by Julian Peto estimates that deaths in western
Europe from mesothelioma will increase from 5,000 per annum (1998) to 9,000 per
annum (2018), and are not expected to peak before 2020." Sadly, it is a story that
continues to unfold its unfortunate chapters. Following the eventual rejection of
asbestos by European and North American construction and engineering industries,
global demand for the deadly material has been maintained by sales to the Far East,
which, by 1991, was purchasing 90 per cent of South Africa's chrysotile. The long-
term global toll of suffering has thus transferred from developed to developing
countries. The medical legacy of continued mining and use of asbestos is set to
continue well into the twenty-first century: mesothelioma can take from 20 to 60
years to be detected. The history of the industry, and the role played by T&N plc
(formerly Turner and Newall, formerly Turner Brothers Asbestos Co. Ltd) that
emerges from documents disclosed during "discovery" in the course of American
9Green College was founded in 1979 as the the Observatory site for its new role within Green
result of a benefaction by Dr Cecil Green, whose College. There is a residential building at the
company, Geophysical Services Ltd, later became western corner ofthe College, completed in 1981,
Texas Instruments. The eighteenth-century known as the Doll Building.
Radcliffe Observatory is the architectural centre- 0Papers discussed in this section are drawn
piece of the site. Purchased in 1934 by Lord from PP/DOL/B.3, unless otherwise identified.
Nuffield, it was presented to the hospital " Julian Peto, 'The European mesothelioma
authorities in 1936 and the Nuffield Institute for epidemic', Br. J. Cancer, 1999, 79: 666-72. See
Medical Research was established there. In 1979, also, J Peto, J T Hodgson, F E Matthews, J R
the Institute moved to new premises in the Jones, 'Continuing increase in mesothelioma',
grounds of the John Radcliffe Hospital, freeing Lancet, 1995, 345: 535-9.
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litigation'2 sets the suffering of asbestos workers in a corporate context of secretive
strategic obstruction, duplicity, attempted suppression, delay and denial.'3 Doll's
study (1955) of 'Mortality from lung cancer among asbestos workers' and related
papers are key documents in this secret history that is now coming to light.
The Doll collection includes not only the 1955 paper (in four texts, holograph
and typescript), but also a considerable range of germane correspondence, chiefly
between Doll and Dr John Knox, Doll's collaborator and source of factory data.
The correspondence available in the Wellcome papers begins in 1948, however, with
Doll's first line of enquiry to Dr Stephen Gloyne (23 January 1948). Gloyne was a
pathologist who had published, in 1934, with W Burton Wood,'4 an early paper
associating lungcancerwith asbestos. Aswell ascontacting andmeetingwith Gloyne,
Doll wrote to Dr Edward Merewether, then Senior Medical Officer for the Ministry
of Labour and previously a Medical Inspector of Factories. Merewether had been
co-author of a report'5 that had led to the introduction of the Asbestos Industry
Regulations (1931) and to the Silicosis and Asbestos (Medical Arrangements) Scheme
(1931).16 Referring to concurrent research with Bradford Hill on smoking and lung
cancer, Doll wrote to Merewether (21 May 1948) that he did not consider the
evidence linking asbestos and lung cancer very convincing but would "like to look
into it a bit further". Merewether and Gloyne evidently pointed Doll in the direction
ofDr Hubert Wyers, then Works Medical Officer forCapeAsbestos, chiefcompetitor
of Turner Brothers. Wyers had written a thesis on the association of lung cancer
with asbestosis, and Doll was keen for the association "to be logically proved" (Doll
to Wyers, 29 June 1948). He went on:
12 In 1995, Chase Manhattan Bank lost its
US$185m action against T&N for the removal of
asbestos from Chase Plaza, its Manhattan
building, constructed in 1959. Under "discovery"
procedure, Chase was granted access to T&N
records at their place of storage in Manchester,
where a vast amount of material was microfilmed
(copies of which, it is hoped, will be deposited at
the Wellcome Library later this year). The
material is deployed in Barry L Castleman,
Asbestos: medical and legal aspects, 4th ed.,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Aspen Law & Business,
1996, and Geoffrey Tweedale, Magic mineral to
killer dust: Turner and Newall and the asbestos
hazard, Oxford University Press, 2000.
3Tweedale, op. cit., note 12 above, provides a
thoroughly researched and comprehensive
account. See also, Geoffrey Tweedale and Philip
Hansen, 'Protecting the workers: the Medical
Board and the asbestos industry, 1930s-1960s',
Med Hist., 1998, 42: 439-57. For the position
that gave rise to the Asbestos Industry
Regulations (1931), see Morris Greenberg,
'Knowledge of the health hazard of asbestos
prior to the Merewether and Price report of
1930', Soc. Hist. Med., 1994, 7: 493-516, and
Nick Wikeley, 'The Asbestos Regulations 1931: a
licence to kill', J Law Soc., 1992, 19: 365-78. For
a counter-argument (that "studies of the early
history of asbestos and occupational health have
been dominated by that most beguiling, though
misleading, of distractions, hindsight"), see Peter
Bartrip, 'Too little, too late? The Home Office
and the Asbestos Industry Regulations, 1931',
Med Hist., 1998, 42: 421-38.
"4'Pulmonary asbestosis', Lancet, 1934, ii:
1383-5. Gloyne was also shortly to publish a
paper that differentiated silicosis and asbestosis
lung cancer: 'Pneumoconiosis: a histological
survey of necropsy material in 1205 cases',
Lancet, 1951, i: 810-14.
5E R A Merewether and C W Price, Report
on effects ofasbestos dust on the lungs and dust
suppression in the asbestos industry, London,
HMSO, 1930.
""A number of other relatively narrow
government statutes provided theoretical
protection for some asbestos employees.
However, the 1931 Regulations and the Medical
and Asbestosis Schemes were to be the basis
for asbestos workers' safety from the 1930s
until 1970." Tweedale, op. cit., note 12 above,
p. 22.
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What is wanted is a definitive population which can be observed to see what proportion
die of cancer of the lung in a given period-a proportion which can be compared with
expectation, based on general mortality figures. A possible way of doing this might be to
define your population as being 'certified cases of asbestosis' and then to follow them to
death. Best of all would be to limit the population to cases certified arising out of the
periodic medical exam at specific factories, but I imagine that would reduce the numbers
too much. I don't know whether you've had anything like that number certified at the
Cape Company since 1931.
A meeting at Cape Asbestos was finally arranged for 24 March 1949. By 6
May 1949, Wyers had "prepared all the figures with the exception of the series
of certification dates and to my surprise I find that the Company's records are
exceedingly scrappy". Both Wyers and Doll endeavoured to obtain the missing
information (from the South Wales Pneumoconiosis Panel), but evidently were
unsuccessful. There is then an unexplained hiatus in the correspondence between
the two, until 15 September 1955, when Myers wrote interestedly to Doll for
reprints of the published paper and there the correspondence, as we have it,
concludes."7
The first communication between Knox and Doll is a letter to Doll (12 April
1953) in which Knox introduces himself, indicates a familiarity with Doll's published
papers to date and offers "some material of interest".'8 He goes on to admit that
his "statistical ability is nil" but he has "approval ... to approach amedical statistical
authority to discuss this question". Notwithstanding this opening statement, an
approval to approach and an approval to publish were to prove to be two very
different things in the eyes of the Turner Brothers Board. As the momentum to
publication gathered pace, the Board became increasingly nervous about the paper's
principal conclusion ofa lung cancer risk often times that ofthe general population
forthosewhohadbeenexposed toasbestosfortwentyyearsormore. Thenervousness
first manifested itself in the Board's refusal to allow Knox's name to be associated
with the paper, despite his instigative role: "I gather that my name on the paper
might not be acceptable as it would naturally suggest Rochdale as the place of
origin" (Knox to Doll, 4 January 1954). The title to the paper, it will be recalled,
contains no reference to company or location, nor, indeed, does the text itself. There
then followed a period of time in which Knox endeavoured to change the Board's
position on the omission ofhis name as co-author. (Simultaneously, it would seem,
the Board tried to use Knox to persuade Doll against publishing at all.'9) Publication
'7Tweedale, op. cit., note 12 above, p. 148, 1954, the board drafted a barrister's letter to
refers to an approach by Doll to Cape Asbestos bully Doll into withdrawing the paper. It stated
in 1953 which was rebuffed, although there is no that a published article 'would be wholly
reference to this in Doll's papers. premature and undesirable from all points of
1 This letter, and nearly all other letters from view.' This was never sent and a visit from the
Knox to Doll in the collection, is written by hand tactful Knox was relied upon instead to extricate
on personal notepaper. The correspondence with the company from a very difficult situation."
Doll is conducted from Knox's home address. Tweedale, op. cit., note 12 above, p. 149.
'9One strategy considered by Turner Brothers
was a legal challenge to publication. "In July,
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was delayed as a consequence, until it became apparent that there would be no
change ofposition and Doll and Knoxjointly decided that the paper should appear
under Doll's name alone.
For my own part, I feel that any positive findings with regard to the cause ofcancer must be
made available to all research workers in the subject (and not limited to those few with whom
we may personally be in contact). There is no knowing, but what may appear at first to have
only a limited application in the industrial field may eventually prove to provide an important
link in the chain of reasoning by which knowledge of the general causation of the disease
may be determined. (Doll to Knox, 8 June 1954).2°
There was, however, a little more to the Board's determination than the removal of
Knox's name from the paper. To arrive at a more complete picture ofthe surrounding
circumstances, it is necessary to look beyond the Wellcome papers to consider
material now in the public domain as a by-product of "discovery" in the Chase
Manhattan Bank lawsuit. Some forty years later, Dr Richard Schilling, editor ofthe
British Journal ofIndustrial Medicine at the time that Doll's paper was submitted,
recalled under oath being paid a personal visit by a member ofthe Turner Brothers
Board: "Well, I remember very, very clearly a man with dark hair, who was a
Director ofTurner & Newall's, coming to me when I was working in the physiology
lab, department, of the University of Manchester, asking me to suppress the
publication of this article."2' Schilling refused to co-operate with the request and
apparently received no further requests of this kind.
The attempt at suppression recounted by Schilling furnishes further context for
the period in which the paper approached its delayed publication, a period of
time in which Doll re-drafted on more than one occasion the paper's concluding
words. Why he did so was the subject of close scrutiny in the cross-examination
of Schilling, particular attention being given to a handwritten addition to a letter
Doll sent to Schilling (3 December 1954). After noting that he would prefer the
paper to be held over until the April issue of 1955, "so as to give the firm an
opportunity to show whether they are genuinely anxious to have further research
undertaken", Doll added, in ink: "Unless I offer them quid pro quo, we may
never find out" (Figure 3). Referee comments (also available in the collection)
had noted that "data is [sic] not produced in the second half of the paper to
show that the risk has now decreased." The problem Doll and Knox faced in
this regard was that of a considerable latency period of at least twenty years
20Doll's letter is addressed not to the Board 21 'Deposition of Professor Richard Selwyn
but to Knox, and it is accompanied by a Francis Schilling, taken at 199 The Strand,
(conspiratorial) covering note: "I enclose a formal London WC2R, England, on the 12th day of
letter which you may care to pass on. Should you January, 1994, commencing at 10:10 a.m.' The
think it is unfortunately worded in any way, Chase Manhattan Bank v. T&N plc (87 Civ.
please send it back to me and I will re-write it. 4436, US District Court, Southern District of
Meanwhile, I am sending the paper off to the New York). A copy of the transcript was made
British Journal of Industrial Medicine, but we available to Chris Beckett by Dr Maurice
shall have at least 4 months to get your name re- Greenberg, 25 January 2002. See also Castleman,
inserted should the Board change their mind" op. cit., note 12 above, pp. 99-100.
(Doll to Knox, also 8 June 1954).
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Figure 3: Doll to Richard Schilling, 3 December 1954. "Unless I offer them quid pro quo, we
may never find out." PP/DOL/B.32/2.
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before the development of malignancy (over twenty-six years was the average
period for the cases of lung cancer and asbestosis reported in the paper). With
the implementation of new regulations in 1931, it was premature to draw, in
1954, firm conclusions about their positive impact on the problem, and an early
draft had concluded: "Insufficient data are available to determine whether the
risk has yet been eliminated by the improved conditions which now exist."
However, this conclusion was to become, in the published text, one that adopted
the past tense ("lung cancer was a specific industrial hazard") and a conclusion
that suggested that times were beginning to change: "The risk has become
progressively less as the duration of employment under the old dusty conditions
has decreased" (see Figure 4). Doll had taken up a suggestion of one of the
referees22 and managed to find sufficient comparative data to substantiate a
conclusion that offered at the very least the prospect of improvement and,
furthermore, served to keep the door open to subsequent studies that might
provide conclusions of greater certainty. In fact, it was not long before the world
was to change around the Rochdale factory irrevocably as the link between
mesothelioma and asbestos began to emerge in incontrovertible data from South
Africa, linking forty-five out of forty-seven cases of mesothelioma with exposure
to crocidolite (commonly referred to as blue asbestos).23
Doll's quidpro quo can be seen either as the beginning of a working relationship
with T&N that would lead to him becoming, in the words of one critic, "a
litigation consultant, too, by the early 1980s",24 or it may be viewed, alternatively,
as the experienced tactics of a pragmatic epidemiologist. Meanwhile, the paper
of 1955 is presented by Sir Donald Acheson to today's generation of aspiring
epidemiologists as "a classic in its own right, which would have gained [Doll] a
place in the history of epidemiology had it been his only publication."25
22 transcript of Schilling's deposition
(p. 100) reveals that one of the three referees for
the paper was Austin Bradford Hill, although the
referee comments relayed anonymously by
Schilling to Doll (see letter of 9 July 1954) cannot
be attributed.
23J C Wagner, C A Sleggs, P Marchand,
'Diffuse pleural mesothelioma and asbestos
exposure in the North-Western Cape Province',
Br. J. ind Med, 1960, 17: 260-71. However, as
late as 1967, a Lancet leading article argued that
"there is a danger that workers' representatives
may overrate the dangers ofdealing with
asbetos." The leader went on to argue, in true
utilitarian style: "Situations arise where the use of
asbestos can save more lives than it can possibly
endanger." Lancet, 1967, i: 1311-12.
24Castleman, op. cit., note 12 above, p. 101.
Tweedale, op. cit., note 12 above, pp. 253-4,
283-5. It is pertinent to note that the printed
proceedings of a conference on vinyl chloride
(New York, 1974), in which a remark ofDoll's
that crocidolite should be banned was mis-
transcribed as "we ought ... to ban the use of
asbestos", provoked in him a measure of
consternation: "In the current situation in
England, in which the industry is coming under
quite unjustifiable attack, the attribution to me of
the opinion that the use of asbestos ought to be
banned is, as you will appreciate, embarrassing."
(Doll to Dr E Cuyler Hammond, 26 May 1977:
PP/DOL/D.1/34.)
25Acheson's introduction to Doll's paper in
John Ashton (ed.), The epidemiological
imagination: a reader, Oxford University Press,
1994, p. 12. Acheson continues: "Almost as an
aside Sir Richard's paper also gives one of the
first and unquestionably one of the simplest
descriptions of the man-years method of
calculating expected numbers. Subsequently this
technique rapidly became established as a
standard way to measure risk in cohort studies.
Previously risk was usually estimated by a
'snapshot' of the situation at the beginning of the
period of exposure, thus wasting much of the
available information."
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Figure 4: The much-revised concluding paragraph to 'Mortality from lung cancer among
asbestos workers (1955). PP/DOL/B.3/2.
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The Spanish Toxic Oil Syndrome26
During the month of May, 1981, clinics in northern Spain were suddenly over-
run with people complaining of nausea, rashes, fever, and breathing difficulties.
Many would eventually die, and those who survived the epidemic developed
wasted muscles, damaged nerves, hair loss and weakened bones. First recognized
in May 1981 (some early cases appearing in April), the peak of the epidemic
occurred in the following June, and would eventually affect some 30,000 people,
including more than 1000 deaths. Geographically, the epidemic was almost
confined to fourteen provinces in central and north-west Spain (although Madrid
itself was little affected), and spread progressively north-west, from the area
around Madrid to Leon.27 The Spanish authorities rapidly determined the cause
as adulterated rapeseed oil, sold as inexpensive olive oil. At the time, Spain did
not permit rapeseed oil to be imported for human consumption and sought to
protect its olive oil industry by ensuring-through the compulsory addition of
aniline28 -that any rapeseed oil that was imported was used only industrially.
Through numerous street market vendors, however, supplies of the oil were made
available for human consumption. It seems that such illegal sales were not a
new phenomenon and had previously led to no known ill-health consequences.
Had the process of aniline-removal changed in some way, or been imperfectly
executed, such that the illicit oil then sold became lethally toxic? Was there a
rogue batch, and could it be traced? Not everyone was convinced, however, by
the cooking oil theory, and from the very beginning there was a competing
theory, that those affected had been poisoned not by adulterated oil but by the
over-zealous use by some Spanish farmers of organo-phosphate fertiliser. Tomato
crops in particular were suspected. Nevertheless, in 1983, at a specially-convened
WHO conference in Madrid, the toxic oil theory was formally accepted by the
international health community and the epidemic received the name by which it
is now known: Spanish Toxic Oil Syndrome.29
Despite the confidence of the assertion, there remained a number of unresolved
epidemiological and toxicological issues, not least that the toxin responsible for
causing the outbreak had not been identified (and remains unidentified to this day).
On 29 August 1984, Dr Roy Goulding, Chair of a WHO steering committee that
26Papers discussed in this section are drawn manufacture of many dyes. Aniline is also
from PP/DOL/C.2/1, unless otherwise identified. important in petroleum refining and in the
27Doll, 'The aetiology of the Spanish Toxic manufacture ofrubber-processing chemicals and
Syndrome: interpretation of the epidemiological antioxidants. It is highly toxic and a suspected
evidence'. Report prepared for WHO, October carcinogen.
1985. Doll's report refers to 20,000 cases. My 29 For the original study on which the oil
figure of 30,000 cases is taken from Woffinden theory is founded, see Juan Manuel Tabuenca,
(see note 30 below). 'Toxic-allergic syndrome caused by ingestion of
28 colourless, oily, organic compound, rapeseed oil denatured with aniline', Lancet,
aniline is of great importance in the dye industry, 1981, ii: 567-8.
being used as the starting substance in the
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was endeavouring to resolve these outstanding matters, wrote to Doll, then Warden
ofGreen College, to ask ifhe would consider reviewing the epidemiological evidence:
Not much progress, I fear, has so far been achieved. However, most of us, I think, are
convinced . . . that there is strong association statistically between the occurrence ofthe disease
and theconsumption ofwhat is termed the 'illicit oil.' Nevertheless there arecertain, vociferous
movements and individuals in Spain who argue otherwise. With a view to resolving this
dispute the WHO people and I are agreed that it might be helpful to refer the epidemiological
data now assembled to, as it were, arbitration.
It was not long before Doll reported that he was "getting deeper into T.O.S-and
into the mire" (Doll to Goulding, 22 May 1985). In particular, he was concerned
to discover that the Spanish government had provided incentives to case-reporting
in the form of promised compensation and free medical care, and that the
available epidemiological data, much of which seemed to have been gathered in
haste, may not have been free from bias. An interim report, presented by Doll
at the steering committee meeting of 1 July 1985, outlined the key questions as
he saw them. Whilst case-control studies strongly suggested an association of the
disease with the adulterated oil, was the association real or an artefact of the
method of inquiry? And, if it was a real association, did it reflect cause and
effect or was it due to the confounding of the consumption of the oil with
something else that was the direct cause? Doll refused to express a conclusive
opinion until he had met the Spanish scientists who supported the alternative
theory of organo-phosphate poisoning.
Doll met with Dr Clavera Ortiz and Dr Martinez Ruiz in Madrid on 21 September
to discuss their views. However, in the absence of hard evidence (Doll to Goulding,
6 December 1985), he did not find "the alternative suggestion ... at all impressive."
He was, however, impressed by their complaint that "the early review committees
in Spain consisted almost entirely ofpeople who had been responsible for the positive
epidemiological studies", and noted with interest that:
... so-called 'industrial oil' had been more or less routinely imported into Spain for human
consumption and that there was likely to have been bias in Spain in the late summer of 1981
in the classification of illnesses which could or could not regularly be associated with the
consumption of oil bought in the affected region.
Struck by their sincerity, it was apparent to Doll-and here we glimpse, in his
remark, something of his disposition to professional practice-that "they were
now emotionally concerned with disproving the oil hypothesis." Following the
WHO Madrid conference of 1983, at which the adulterated oil theory did not
receive unanimous support, the Spanish authorities had decided to make a
renewed enquiry into the evidence so far amassed. Along with a number of other
specialists, Clavera Ortiz and Martinez Ruiz formed an official team ofinvestigation
which, after reviewing the distribution of the oil and the distribution of the
epidemic, quickly came to the inconvenient conclusion, as some have seen it,
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that there was little correlation between the two. Before long, it seems they were
dismissed from their investigative roles and the commission was disbanded.30 Doll
had delayed in producing his report until he had met them. Although his report
of October 1985 did not, unsurprisingly, favour an alternative theory, it did not
support the adulterated oil theory with anything like the confidence that its
supporters had hoped. "Laboratory studies have ... failed to demonstrate toxicity
in any of the samples that were recovered, no specific chemical that might have
caused the disease has been identified, and the conclusion that the oil was
responsible rests primarily on the epidemiological evidence." As for the epi-
demiological evidence, there were "too many gaps in [it] to allow the conclusion
that oil was definitely the cause." Doll wanted a more exact correlation between
the supply of oil and the epidemic's temporal and geographic distribution.
Furthermore, there was the issue of linking the numerous sporadic cases to
demonstrable exposure to the adulterated oil. Doll's position left the door ajar,
however, and pointed ways towards achieving greater certainty. In particular, the
problem of sporadic cases turned upon a fundamental principle of epidemiological
inquiry, one that calls to mind the widow of Hampstead and her niece who
played significant roles in John Snow's investigation of the London cholera
outbreak of 1854. It will be recalled that the widow in question was partial to
water from a particular pump in Broad Street, Soho, near to where her husband
had owned a factory, and therefore insisted upon a daily supply of her favourite
water being brought to her. When cholera swept through Soho in the summer
of 1854, her taste for water from the Broad Street pump was to cost her dearly,
as the only inhabitant of Hampstead to contract cholera and die. She drank the
water on Thursday 31 August and died two days later. Her niece, who had
chosen an unfortunate time to pay a visit to her aunt, also drank the infected
water, then returned to her home in Islington and died the following day.3"
Meanwhile, Doll looked forward to obtaining "a list of sporadic cases" of the
Spanish toxic syndrome "with a note of the extent to which they were known
to be exposed."32
Following the (limited) circulation of Doll's report, concerns were expressed
privately between other WHO experts working on the epidemic that its conclusions
"might well lead to pressure within Spain to do a great deal of investigation of
highly improbable alternative hypotheses" (Dr E M Kilbourne to Dr S Tarkowski,
25 November 1985). Kilbourne continued:
3 Bob Woffinden, 'Cover-up', Guardian, 25 Churchill, 1855. The text is also available at:
August 2001, provides a recent (partisan) over- http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow/snowbook2.html.
view, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/ Snow's work on cholera was referred to by Doll
Archive/Article/0,4273,4244093,00.html. during his testimony in Madrid at the trial of
31 John Snow, 'Instances of the communication thirty-eight Spanish oil merchants charged with
ofcholera through the medium ofpolluted water fraud and public health offences (see cutting from
at Hampton West End (the water being carried The Times, 7 July 1987, in PP/DOL/C.2/1/20).
from Broad Street)', On the mode of 32Doll, WHO Report, 1985, op. cit., note 27
communication ofcholera, 2nd ed., London, J above, p. 27.
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To avoid such an eventuality, I wonder if Sir Richard might consider making a more specific
conclusion regarding his opinion on the likelihood of the oil hypothesis? To those of us
working on the 'front lines' it would be most helpful if he were to underline among his
conclusions a point to which the rest of the report seems to lead: that the oil hypothesis,
while not unequivocably [sic] established, is sufficiently probable that studies designed to
confirm or disprove its role in the etiology of TOS are the ones most appropriately pursued
at the present time. Of course, he could only make such a statement if I am correct in my
inference, that this is his own view on the subject.
Four days later, Kilbourne forwarded a copy of his letter directly to Doll, together
with, to add weight, a signed statement from members of the discontinued Spanish
clinical investigation commission.33 Doll's response was to send Kilbourne a copy
ofa letter to Tarkowski (11 December 1985) in which he had reiterated his position,
that he did not consider the case for adulterated oil to be proven, and that "it might
come to be regarded as proved ifit were possible to undertake further research along
the lines suggested in the last paragraph of[his] report." Further research continued,
such that, by June 1987, Doll had added an Addendum to the report in which he
made the unequivocal statement that-notwithstanding an opening caveat that the
new evidence was "of variable quality"-many interested parties had been waiting
for, and other parties had hoped not to read: "With the addition ofthis new evidence,
I conclude that adulterated oil was the cause ofthe toxic syndrome."34 It was a shift
in position on which Doll was to be closely examined at the trial ofthe oil suppliers
in Milan (Doll testified 6-7 July 1987). Privately, however, Doll wrote to Goulding
(1 April 1987) in a manner that suggested some niggling doubts remained about
unresolved details and the manner in which much of the epidemiology had been
conducted:
The evidence produced is of course strong evidence in support of the association. What is
worrying is the omission of any reference to the third convent where the association is far
from clear. The selective publication ofpositive evidence ignoring the little contrary evidence
justifies the accusation that only positive evidence is published and makes one wonder whether
there may be some justification for the belief that the whole picture has been distorted. I do
not believe that this is likely but it strengthens the need for an independent review of the
laboratory results in Sevilla, which I recommended, to check that the diagnosis of TOS in
the few individuals in the town had not been conditioned by knowledge of their exposure to
the oil. I remain most disturbed that Kilbourne should have allowed himself to be used in
this way.
Nevertheless, Doll stuck steadfastly to his revised conclusion at the Milan trial, a
testimony that was to last for thirteen hours over two days, from which he emerged
33'Comments of Drs. Tabuenca, Abaitua, November 1985, and signed by the individual
Castro, Diaz de Rojas, and Posada (Members of doctors.
the former Subcommission for Clinical 34'The aetiology of the Spanish Toxic
Investigation, National Program for the Toxic Syndrome: interpretation of the epidemiological
Syndrome) regarding the preliminary report of evidence: Addendum 8.6.87', p. 7.
Sir Richard Doll.' The document is dated 27
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into the light of day-gentleman guarantor ofjustice and compensation35-to the
cheers ofvictims of the epidemic and their families.
It is striking how significant a role is played by the choice of words in the
presentation ofepidemiological findings over and above non-verbal datamore readily
associatedwithscientificcommunication. The 1955 paperonlungcancerandasbestos
exposure received, as we have seen, considerable re-drafting to strike an appropriate
note. Whilst we can safely assume that an appropriate note is one that presents to
its readership research findings with both fidelity and clarity, the additional shaping
pressure of audience is another influential factor, particularly when the interested
readership comprises more than the professional attention of peers. In the case of
the Spanish "arbitration" exercise that Doll undertook, there were also language
and cultural barriers to surmount. When Kilbourne expressed doubts about the
wording ofDoll's conclusion to his report, fearing "misinterpretation", hewas noting
the likely influence of culturally-determined differences in reception between an
English and a Spanish audience. "I fear this based on the way I have seen criticism
given and taken here" (Kilbourne to Doll, 29 November 1985). Kilbourne wanted
a more explicit statement, that further research in support of the adulterated oil
theory was the likeliest avenue ofpursuit to provide the conclusive evidence desired
by all. Even the vagaries of (a WHO) translation played a not insignificant role in
the presentation of Doll's argument, when Kilbourne advised Doll that decena can
be translated as either ten precisely or, less precisely, ten or so orabout ten (Kilbourne
to Doll, 9 September 1985). Here, the difference in translation was not a point of
style but was material to the epidemiological evidence, in so far as it determined
whether or not the nuns of the convent at Casarrubios del Monte had purchased
supplies ofadulterated oil (it having been firmly established that adulterated oil was
not available for sale before 11 February 1981).36
Concluding Remarks
As we have seen from the two examples discussed above, many sections ofsociety
are likely to have a stake in the outcome of any given exercise of epidemiological
research. Its public health orientation, encompassing occupational health, guarantees
that many voices will conspire to ensure that the wise epidemiologist is one who
chooses his or her words with care, fully cognizant of the scrutiny they will receive
from many pairs of eyes. Misrepresentation by the press, however, is one prospect
that cannot be easily guarded against, and, within the mass ofmaterial in the Doll
papers, there is a remarkable file of letters to Doll from a section of the general
public perhaps least expected to give vent to invective. I shall conclude with some
brief comments on these letters.
In June 1973, on the eve of health service reorganization and shortly before
delivering his Nuffield Lecture, 'Monitoring the Health Service' (PP/DOL/D.1/27),
35"As 200 people, many of them related to The Times, 8 July 1987 (newspaper cutting from
victims of the episode, waited to see him, one PP/DOL/C.2/1/20).
woman shouted: 'That's what I call a real 36Doll, WHO Report, 1985, op. cit., note 27
gentleman, not like what we have here."' above, pp. 19-21.
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Doll addressed the Medical Journalists' Association to provide them with a summary
ofhis key points. Doll's remarks proved to be the stuff ofwhich newspaper headlines
are made. The sentiment that stirred a quiet senior citizen "cohort" to loud and
angry epistolary action was the notion that they should not "cling to life" but should,
instead, as socially responsible citizens, "live dangerously". The Daily Telegraph, to
cite a less sensational example, wrote:
Old people over 65 should be prepared to accept death and should not be thinking of how
to preserve their life a few more months, a 60 year-old professor of medicine said yesterday.
It was their social responsibility to 'live dangerously' and not expect the Health Service to
spend time and money on research into prolonging their lives.37
More than seventy senior citizens wrote to Doll to complain about his views,
many struck by how close in age Doll was himself to the threshold that he was
advocating.38 Some letters were supportive, but most were, by turns, abusive and
racist, and still others were the indignant reactions of the active old. Doll's paper
addressed the theme of scarce Health Service resources, a theme that has
resounded through the years. "I'm afraid my views when divested of their
newspaper presentation are not very exciting", Doll wrote to one colleague. "So
far as the National Health Service is concerned," he continued, "I have suggested
that it was more important for it to seek out and attempt to relieve disability
than to undertake research on methods of increasing the present biological
lifespan."39 I draw the researcher's attention to these letters from the general
public not because they are representative in any way that an epidemiologist or
a statistician might find useful. Rather, they represent the sort of buffeting
response, from which authors of epidemiology papers are usually sheltered, that
will always potentially lie in wait for social commentators, and many of Doll's
later papers tend towards pondering health and social policy. Now preserved
amongst the papers of a distinguished epidemiologist, these letters sit as fearful
and awkwardly individual human voices, for the most part unpleasantly so,
caught-like paradoxical flies in amber-in the archival record of a medical
science oriented not towards the individual cry but towards population groups
and the statistical patterns they make. The letters appear bigger than life-size, as
if viewed from the wrong end of the epidemiologist's telescope. They reveal a
human rawness, absent elsewhere in the papers, displaying indignation, prejudice
37Clare Dover, 'Over-65s should "live "Bernard Shaw's concept of creative evolution ...
dangerously and expect to die"', Daily Telegraph, postulates a stable old age not subject to
28 June 1973, p. 19 (PP/DOL/D.1/28). progressive deterioration, in which life is
38 was born on 28 October 1912. terminated by an inevitable accident . . What is
Doll to Dr W H Lloyd, 9 July 1973 (PP/ more plausible is Aldous Huxley's concept in his
DOL/D.1/28). One of Doll's correspondents (Dr Brave New World, the inhabitants of which lived
H M White) recalled the words of Sir Keith at a peak of fitness for 65 years until their life
Joseph, reported in newspapers only two weeks was terminated by sudden physical and mental
prior to Doll's headlines, that Britain was a fine deterioration over a few weeks. Something like
country in which to be injured or acutely ill "but this may be possible, though the period of
do not be old or frail or mentally ill here, at least deterioration is likely to last years rather than
not for a few years". In 'The route back to weeks and, as a sexuagenarian, I am glad to note
Methusaleh' (PP/DOL/D.2/17), the Hunterian that the model span should be at least 20 years
Society Lecture for 1980, Doll concludes: longer."
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and a survival-determination that instinctively springs from fear and threat. Doll
took the trouble to reply to each correspondent (in the file, there is a clutch of
letters marked No address, reminiscent of material from a Central Middlesex
Hospital trial) outlining his misrepresentation, and some wrote back to retract
hasty words, some astonished that a Knight of the Realm should contact them
directly.
Doll's strong sense of historical tradition would have alerted him to a certain
irony in his position. Indeed, there are several ironies that can be teased out.
For Doll was not the only knighted Regius Professor of Medicine to be associated
in newspaper headlines with the suggestion of natural limitations to the human
span, and to human abilities as the years advance. In 1905, on retiring from
John Hopkins University as Professor of Medicine, shortly to take up his
appointment as Regius Professor ofMedicine in Oxford, William Osler's valedictory
address to his American colleagues asserted "the comparative uselessness of men
above forty years of age" and, losing the "comparative" qualification, "the
uselessness of men above sixty years of age."' The title of Osler's address, 'The
fixed period', was taken from a novel by Anthony Trollope by the same name.4'
Set in the late twentieth century-approximately, that is, co-terminous with Doll's
briefing to the Medical Journalists' Association, to cite another irony-on a
fictitious island offNew Zealand in which "men retired for a year ofcontemplation
before a peaceful departure by chloroform",42 Trollope's dystopia unfolds the
social dynamic of ageism. On the imaginary island of Britannula, the young
inhabitants, in the guise of relieving suffering and benefiting society, devise a
system that discriminates against the elderly. However, as they grow old themselves,
we are not surprised to read that they begin to see things differently and rebel
against the system they had devised.
Osler claimed that his valedictory words were intended "to relieve a situation
of singular sadness", although he did not change his view that "after the sixtieth
year it would be best for the world and best for themselves if men rested from
their labours."43 Notwithstanding, Osler was to continue working at Oxford for
another ten productive years, and Sir Richard Doll, born in 1912, who will be
enjoying his ninetieth birthday this year, did not publish his earliest work of
note before vigorously peering across Osler's first threshold of uselessness.
4' Sir William Osler, Aequanimitas, 2nd ed., 42Osler, op. cit., note 40 above, p. 399.
London, H K Lewis, 1922, pp. 397-8. 43'Preface to the Second Edition', ibid.,
41 To add to the ironies at play, Trollope's The p. viii.
fixedperiod was published in 1882, his sixty-
seventh year and the year in which he died.
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